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Abstract: Introduced with the hope of reducing refereeing errors and increasing 
“football justice”, the Video Assistant Referee (VAR) has attracted much criticism 
from players and spectators alike. Drawing on evidence from domestic and 
international competitions from the past three years, this article investigates the 
problems that have become apparent with the system. It argues that the success of 
technological aids like the VAR depends on the nature of the norms on which they 
adjudicate. Just like legal norms, football laws can be divided into rules and 
standards. While the VAR has the ability to make a substantial contribution to 





The Video Assistant Referee (VAR) is arguably the most significant development 
in football officiating since the introduction of yellow and red cards in the 1970s. 
After initial pushback from football’s central governance body FIFA, it was 
adopted in 2018, with some national leagues already using the system the preceding 
year. Its design resembles the various instant replay mechanisms that have become 
common in many sports, such as tennis, basketball, cricket, and American football. 
The VAR watches the game from a dedicated video operating room, with access to 
live footage of the on-pitch action. Its task is to alert the head referee of “clear and 
obvious errors” and “serious missed incidents” relating to four reviewable calls – 
goal/no goal, penalty kick decisions, red cards, and cases of mistaken identity – 
which are deemed to represent the most significant refereeing decisions in football.1 
 
 
* London School of Economics. Email: j.zglinski@lse.ac.uk. 




The introduction of the VAR and, a couple of years earlier, that of the Goal Line 
Technology (GLT), triggered a debate as to the promise and perils of technological 
aids in football. Advocates argued that the reforms would reduce the number of 
officiating errors and, in this way, increase “football justice” (Simòn 2019; Ryall 
2012). Critics warned against exceedingly technologizing the sport. Nlandu (2012) 
suggested that the reforms were motivated by the erroneous belief that refereeing 
decisions are of central importance for the outcome of a football game and rested 
on the equally wrong assumption that some match situations affect the result more 
than others. Collins (2010) claimed, based on an analysis of systems set up in other 
sports, that the technological devices would create a “false transparency” as they 
would have significant error margins that would not be displayed to the public. 
 
This article does not seek to revisit the question as to whether technological aids 
should be employed in football but will provide a preliminary assessment of the 
VAR’s functioning, based on the experience with the system in national and 
international competitions over the past three years. What contribution has the VAR 
made to policing infractions of football norms? In which areas has it been effective, 
in which ones has it not, and why? The thesis put forward is that the technology has 
had a positive impact on officiating in relation to rule-like football laws, while 
having a much more limited success when it comes to standard-like offences. In 
what follows, I shall first explain what is meant by these terms and show that 
football norms, just as legal norms, can be divided into rules and standards. I will 
then go on to argue that their respective properties have repercussions for the 
incidents that can be reviewed by the video referee and the threshold for VAR 
intervention, and address some of the recently made proposals to reform the system. 
 
1. Rules and Standards 
 
When talking about legal directives, lawyers distinguish between rules and 
standards. Both types follow an “If X, then Y” model (Ehrlich and Posner 1974; 
Schlag 1985), but the respective X – in some cases, also the Y – differ. Rules are 
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structured as follows: if a specific fact occurs (or a set of facts), this triggers a 
certain pre-defined legal response. The example most commonly used in legal 
scholarship is speed limits, such as “it is prohibited to drive faster than 30 miles per 
hour” or “those driving fast than 30 miles per hour will receive a £100 fine”. To 
find out whether a motorist has violated this rule one just needs to answer the 
question as to whether the triggering fact has occurred: does the car move at a speed 
greater than 30 miles per hour? If so, the legal consequence takes effect (prohibition 
or fine).  
 
Standards are more complex in nature. Instead of laying down factual criteria that 
will, once met, automatically prompt a certain response, they require the decision-
maker to apply some background principles, which encapsulate the rationale behind 
the norm, to the case at hand (Sullivan 1992; Korobkin 2000). The law of 
negligence is a good example. It is, in many countries, defined as not acting as a 
“reasonable person” would. When deciding whether a certain conduct was or was 
not negligent, there is no one simple fact that a judge can rely on. They must 
consider whether the precautions taken, the foreseeability of the conduct, the harm 
done, and similar considerations warrant punishing the defendant.  
 
The difference between rules and standards can be made sense of as giving a norm 
content ex ante or ex post (Kaplow 1992). While the normative substance of a rule 
is clearly set out in advance, i.e. before any individual conduct has even taken place, 
standards are normatively under-determinate and must be concretized at the stage 
of application, when the legality of a specific act is assessed. From an institutional 
perspective, this means that rule-like norms are fully articulated by the law-maker, 
which conclusively decides what type of conduct is prohibited. Standard-like 
norms, by way of contrast, are only “sketched” by the law-maker and primarily 
shaped by the institution charged with enforcing them (usually a court or agency). 
Moreover, the choice between rules and standards affects what it is that the 
enforcing authority has to do. When it comes to rules, the only thing which is 
required is a factual assessment or, more precisely, an assessment of whether the 
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triggering fact has occurred. Standard-based decisions likewise require some fact-
finding but, in addition, hinge on an evaluative judgment that will incorporate and 
reconcile the principles behind the norm. 
 
Note that the distinction between the two types is not always clear cut (Schlag 1985; 
Schauer 2003). Rules often have exceptions that make it necessary to consider 
additional facts going beyond the narrow triggering criteria (e.g. it is illegal to 
punch someone unless for self-defence) or qualifications which are formulated in a 
standard-like fashion (e.g. all foreign marriages are recognized except those which 
are contrary to “public order”).2 Standards, by way of contrast, can contain elements 
of rules, such as specific tests or guidelines, or can acquire a rule-like nature over 
time once a sufficient number of precedents clarifies their meaning. Therefore, the 
two should be thought of as the extremes of a sliding scale rather than in strictly 
dichotomous terms.3  
 
One misunderstanding should, however, be avoided. The distinction is not to be 
confused with the one drawn by Russell (1999) between rules and principles. 
Inspired by Dworkin (1977), Russell has argued that sports are not just governed 
by formal norms, i.e. those explicitly laid down in the official handbooks, but also 
by unwritten principles such as fair play and sportsmanship. The rules/standards-
distinction, at least in theory, applies to all football norms, even if in the following 
the focus will be on those of the formal kind. Vice versa, the role of principles is 
more pronounced in relation to standard-based calls, where principles can help the 
referee concretise the given norm. 
 
Both rules and standards have their advantages and disadvantages. Rules 
communicate clearly that a certain behaviour is (or is not) allowed and, thus, 
establish a strong incentive (or deterrent) for engaging in it. As a consequence, they 
reduce the number of legal disputes and, where these do arise, are comparatively 
easy to apply and produce predictable outcomes. However, rules also have 
drawbacks. They can be hard to create in the first place as the law-maker must agree 
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in advance on all the considerations that are relevant for assessing a certain scenario. 
More importantly, they tend to cause problems of over- and under-inclusion 
(Schauer 1991). The clear-cut consequences they stipulate can, in borderline cases, 
appear unfair, even at odds with the principles motivating them. Standards prevent 
this issue by letting the institution enforcing them decide on a case-by-case basis, 
and upon consideration of all pertinent concerns, what behaviour is acceptable. 
Because of that, however, the decision also becomes less predictable and more 
challenging to make. 
 
The efficiency of each type of norm depends on the given context (Korobkin 2000). 
Rules tend to work better in areas which are well understood and marked by similar 
factual patterns, whereas standards are more appropriate for fields that are factually 
heterogenous or tend to evolve quickly, for example due to scientific progress. 
These strengths and weaknesses are often considered by law-makers before 
formulating a norm, in order to ensure that the most efficient solution is adopted. It 
is a fascinating question, but one which cannot be addressed here, which type of 
norm is most appropriate under which conditions for regulating social behaviour in 
football. Instead, the focus in the following shall be on the implications of the 
choice, once made, of one over the other on officiating. How does formulating a 
football norm as a rule or a standard affect the work of referees and video assistants? 
To understand this issue, we have to take a closer look at the nature of football 
norms first. 
 
2. The Laws of the Game 
 
Football is governed by the so-called “Laws of the Game”, a collection of norms 
dating to 1863 which is controlled and annually updated by the International 
Football Association Board (IFAB). Similar in format to a statute or code, they 
contain 18 laws that set out authoritatively how football is and is not to be played. 
This includes organizational matters, such as the pitch size, the location of field 
markings, and the dimensions and quality of the ball. More importantly for 
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everyday officiating, they also determine questions relating to scoring and 
permissible behaviour during a match. 
 
Just like legal norms, the Laws of the Game can be divided into rules and standards.4 
Perhaps the most famous rule is that “a goal is scored when the whole of the ball 
passes over the goal line”. The response (goal) is triggered if the pre-defined fact 
(ball is over the line) occurs. Another well-known and more frequently applied rule 
is that of (active5) offside. It prohibits passes to players who are, with any part of 
their body with which they could potentially score, nearer to the opponent’s goal 
line than both the ball and the second-last opponent. Again, the triggering fact 
(passing to a player who is in an offside position) automatically leads to a specific 
response (free kick for the defending side). 
 
Other football laws are standards. Early versions of the Laws of the Game 
prohibited “ungentlemanly behaviour”, an offence which has in the meantime been 
replaced with that of “unsporting behaviour”. What counts as ungentlemanly or 
unsporting has never been laid down, even if an indicative list of prohibited conduct 
has emerged over time,6 and is to be determined based on ideas of fairness, 
sportsmanship, and decency. Another law makes it a red-card offence to engage in 
“serious foul play”, which is defined as a challenge that “endangers the safety” of 
an opponent or uses “excessive force or brutality”, broad notions which require 
normative concretization by the referee. Crucially, most infractions resulting in a 
penalty kick are formulated as standards. This includes handball offences, which 
lead to a penalty if a player of the defending side “deliberately” touches the ball in 
the penalty area with their hand/arm or touches the ball in a way that makes their 
body “unnaturally bigger”. It also extends to penalties resulting from a foul, which 
require that the defender kicks, pushes, or tackles the opponent in a manner that is 
“careless, reckless or using excessive force”. 
 
It is worthwhile noting that this categorization is not static. Over time, many 
standards have, partly or completely, turned into rules. (The opposite evolution, 
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from rule to standard, is rarer but can also be observed at times.7) This notably 
happens when guidelines explicitly prohibiting a certain type of conduct are added 
to and, thus, concretize an otherwise open-textured football law. For instance, in 
the late 1990s, after a rise in aggressive fouls, the aforementioned general definition 
of “serious foul play” was complemented with a provision specifically stipulating 
that studs-up tackles from behind would be punished by sending off. A few years 
later, an amendment to the Laws of the Game clarified that removing one’s jersey 
during a goal celebration would, from now on, constitute “unsporting behaviour” 
and prompt a yellow card. In cases like these, a rule is carved out for a specific 
behaviour within the broader normative space of a standard. 
 
The choice between formulating a football norm as a rule or a standard has a series 
of implications for officiating. When it comes to rule-like offences, the main focus 
is on the occurrence of the given situation or prohibited action. From the refereeing 
side, this means that a factual assessment is at the heart of the call. If the ball passes 
the goal line between the goalposts in its entirety, the attacking side has scored a 
goal. If a player takes off their shirt after scoring, they will receive a yellow card. It 
does not matter whether the ball has crossed the line merely by a couple of 
millimetres. Nor does it matter that the jersey was just off for a few seconds or an 
endearing message was hidden underneath it. The fulfilment of the law’s factual 
criteria automatically leads to the award or sanction. This might, at times, feel harsh 
(“it was so close!”) or even unfair (“but he or she did not mean to!”). Alas, this is 
the nature of rules. Once the facts have been established, the consequence is 
unavoidable, even if, in atypical or marginal cases, there will be costs of over- or 
under-inclusion. 
 
The situation is different for standards. Here, a factual assessment is required, too, 
but it is only the first and, typically, not the most important element of the referee’s 
decision. Take penalty kicks from a foul. The referee must, to begin with, determine 
whether there was physical contact between the defender and the opponent: has the 
former kicked, pushed, or tackled the latter? This is the easy and usually clear part 
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of the call. Much trickier and more significant is the evaluative side: was this done 
in a manner that is “careless, reckless or using excessive force”? This requires an 
analysis of factors such as the strength of the contact, the speed of the action, and 
the degree to which it has impacted on the opponent’s goal-scoring attempt. There 
is a continuum ranging from light challenges with a minimal effect on the striker to 
openly violent tackles that completely foreclose the opportunity to score. Where the 
line between permissible and punishable action ought to be drawn is not laid down 
in the Laws of the Game. It is, as sports commentators say, a “judgment call”.  
 
As a consequence, standard-based decisions differ from rule-based calls in two 
ways. Institutionally, instead of football’s “law-maker”, the IFAB, determining 
what constitutes permissible and what impermissible behaviour, the decision is 
delegated to the referee. Substantively, referees have discretion when it comes to 
shaping the given football law’s normative content. This is not to say that they have 
an unfettered interpretive freedom; certain calls are outside their scope of 
discretion. For example, under no reasonable reading of the handball laws can a 
player be punished if they have touched the ball despite keeping their arms behind 
their back, as defenders have recently started doing when blocking shots in the 
penalty area. But the referees’ interpretive discretion is considerable. Those 
watching football in different countries will be familiar with this issue. The 
threshold for being awarded a penalty kick for a foul is considerably higher in the 
English Premier League, where referees require substantial physical contact, than 
in the Italian Serie A or Spain’s La Liga, where lighter challenges are also punished. 
Similarly, there is significant variation in the degree to which players and managers 
are allowed to protest against a refereeing decision before being cautioned or sent 
off. This is a direct consequence of the standard-like nature of the applicable 
football laws. 
 
The divergences are further magnified by the lack of a system of precedent. In law 
and regulation, standards often turn into rules over time as a consequence of a 
growing body of jurisprudence or administrative practice (Kaplow 1992, 577). 
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Once the Supreme Court decides that not looking left and right before crossing the 
street is negligent as it violates what can be expected from a reasonable person, or 
an agency finds that products containing a certain chemical compound constitute a 
danger to human health as they increase the risk of cancer, this decision binds future 
assessments. Such mechanisms do not exist in football. A referee is, at least de jure, 
not obliged to award a penalty kick for a certain challenge just because another 
referee has awarded one for the same type of challenge in a match last week. What 
is more, they are not obliged to do so if they themselves took such a decision in a 
previous game. Strictly speaking, they are not even bound by their own prior 
decision in that very match. This means that actions potentially violating standards 
can be assessed every time afresh (see Schauer 2003). National referee associations 
such as the Professional Game Match Officials Limited (PGMOL) group, which 
oversees refereeing in the top competitions in England and Wales, provide an 
informal counterbalance in this context. They make consistency a condition of 
being assigned games to officiate, demoting inconsistent referees to lower leagues 
or striking them from the register altogether. Despite this, referees retain a high 
degree of flexibility when applying football laws. 
 
3. The Video Assistant Referee I: Reviewable Decisions and Incidents 
 
Football has, in comparison to other sports, been late in embracing technological 
aids.8 Although calls for replay systems have been made since the advent of TV 
broadcasting, they faced continued opposition at the higher echelons of football 
governance. It was feared that video technologies were too expensive and 
unreliable, that they would affect the simplicity and fluidity of football, and, 
somewhat oddly, that they would rob fans of the joy of debating controversial 
officiating decisions (see Ryall 2012). Only in the late 2000s and early 2010s the 
push for reform gained momentum. A series of refereeing errors surrounding the 
2010 World Cup – amongst them a goal scored by Thierry Henry in the qualifiers 
that should have been disallowed due to handball and an incident in the round of 16 
where England were denied a goal against Germany although the ball had clearly 
10 
 
passed the line – made it plain that change was necessary. As a result, in 2012 the 
GLT was adopted, an electronic system that verifies and informs the referee 
whether a goal has been scored. After gaining experience with the new device and 
the departure of some members of the “old guard” at FIFA due to a corruption 
scandal, the ground was ready for a deeper dive into technological aids. In 2018, 
after extensive testing, the VAR was introduced. It has, since, gradually been put to 
use in all major domestic and international competitions, including the 2018 men’s 
and 2019 women’s World Cups, the Champions League, the Copa Libertadores, 
and the Club World Cup. 
 
When and how the VAR ought to be used is laid down in a special protocol attached 
to the Laws of the Game. The system is based on the principle of “minimum 
interference, maximum benefit” (IFAB 2016). At the centre of officiating remains 
the on-pitch referee (and their assistants, formerly known as “linesmen”), who 
always must make the initial decision and is responsible for the final call. The VAR, 
who sits in a special video operation room and has access to live footage of the 
game from different camera angles, silently checks all decisions made in relation to 
an exhaustive list of four reviewable actions, but is only supposed to intervene in 
the event of a “clear and obvious error” or “serious missed incident”. The ultimate 
decision is to be taken by the referee based on information from the VAR or after 
undertaking an on-field review on a dedicated screen located on the side of the field. 
 
The decisions and incidents that the VAR can review are limited to: (1) goal/no 
goal; (2) penalty/no penalty; (3) direct red card; and (4) mistaken identity (for 
yellow and red cards). Although that might not seem much, this catalogue means 
that the VAR has a supervisory function for over a dozen of different types of calls. 
Regarding the issue of goal/no goal, it must review, inter alia, whether the attacking 
side has committed an offence in the build-up to or scoring of the goal (through a 
foul, handball, or offside), whether the ball has gone out of play, and whether the 
ball has crossed the line. In relation to penalties, its tasks include monitoring 
whether a penalty kick was correctly awarded or not awarded, whether the offence 
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leading to the penalty was committed inside the penalty area, and whether any other 
offence has occurred during the build-up. Finally, there is a handful of offences 
triggering a red card, such as serious foul play and violent conduct, in addition to 
the issue of punishing the right player. 
 
Some of these reviewable decisions are based on rules and it is here that the VAR 
has brought the greatest improvements. This notably concerns offside. In the pre-
VAR world, incorrect offside calls were a normal occurrence in football games, 
with studies consistently reporting error rates between 11 and 26%.9 While some 
scholars attributed the problems to optical errors caused by a wrong positioning of 
the assistant referees (Oudejans et al. 2000), others put forward the so-called “flash 
lag” hypothesis according to which the human eye has difficulties in identifying the 
position of two objects if one of them moves (Helsen et al. 2006; Catteeuw et al. 
2010). The VAR has dramatically reduced mistakes in this area. Even if Gianni 
Infantino’s announcement after the 2018 World Cup that offside is “finished” may 
have been overly optimistic,10 it is true that, with regard to clear offside, incorrect 
calls have essentially disappeared. The situation is more complicated for marginal 
offside, an issue I shall address below. 
 
Similar improvements can be observed in relation to other reviewable rule-based 
incidents. Cases of mistaken identity were never too frequent in football, but could, 
at times, have severe consequences, for instance if a player wrongly received a 
second yellow card and was sent off – they have vanished since the introduction of 
the VAR. The same goes for errors relating to the location of a foul (inside or 
outside the penalty area), which determine whether the punishment is a penalty or 
free kick. Even infractions of recently added rules are being monitored effectively. 
A 2019 amendment to the Laws of the Game established that goals scored directly 
from an attacking player’s hand or arm or, immediately after, by their teammate 
(offensive handball) are prohibited, regardless of whether the touch is accidental or 




The VAR system has been much less successful in bringing a sense of “football 
justice” when it comes to decisions involving standards. Reviews concerning 
penalties continue to prompt frequent and fierce criticisms from players, managers, 
and fans, at levels comparable or even higher than pre-VAR.11 Penalties for 
handball have proven to be one persistent bone of contention. As explained earlier, 
the handling of the ball by a player from the defending side is not per se prohibited; 
it must either be “deliberate” or “unnaturally” enlarge their body. Refereeing 
decisions relating to these requirements regularly end up being disputed. Numerous 
examples could be cited, but one that has particularly stuck with fans of the German 
Bundesliga is the home game of Borussia Dortmund against Bayern Munich in the 
2019/20 season. Halfway through the second half, a promising shot by Dortmund’s 
striker Erling Haaland in the penalty area was blocked by Bayern’s centre back 
Jerome Boateng, who extended his elbow at a 45 degree angle, thus effectively 
adding a triangle-shaped surface to the right part of his body. To the astonishment 
of the Dortmund supporters, the referee did not award a penalty – and the VAR did 
not intervene. What further fuelled their anger was that merely five days later, 
during Dortmund’s next fixture, their opponent Paderborn was awarded a penalty 
for what essentially was a carbon copy of the incident, just this time with Borussia’s 
defender Mats Hummels using his elbow. Again, the VAR did not intervene. 
 
Calls concerning penalty kicks for a foul remain just as disputed. The intensity and 
type of contact that referees require for awarding a penalty kick substantially differs 
and the VAR has not managed to remove controversy from this area. Again, plenty 
of examples could illustrate the point, but one representative incident happened 
during the Premier League match between Norwich City and Manchester United in 
October 2019. United’s striker Daniel James was moving into the penalty area at a 
quick pace, closely followed by a Norwich defender. Both players ended up leaning 
into each other, trying to get a physical advantage, before going to the ground. It 
was one of these 50/50-calls or, perhaps more accurately, a 40/60-call, as the video 
footage appeared to show that the United striker was doing more of the pushing. 
The referee on the pitch decided that there had been no defensive foul, but the VAR 
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intervened and, after a lengthy break, advised to award the penalty kick. The 
intervention sparked much debate, with many arguing that an initially correct 
decision had been turned into an incorrect one. 
 
Why has the VAR been so effective in improving football officiating in one domain 
and much less so in the other? The answer has to do with the technology’s design 
and the nature of the football laws it is tasked with monitoring. The VAR, in 
essence, is an additional referee with an excellent view over what is happening on 
the pitch. It is, much like the name of the company producing it, a “hawk eye”: it 
captures all the incidents occurring during a match in high resolution, including 
those which the on-pitch referee has not seen or not seen well. Thus, its main 
advantage over the head referee, and its core added value to football officiating, is 
epistemic. This is why the VAR is exceptionally good at policing rule-like offences, 
which primarily depend on whether certain facts have or have not occurred. 
Whenever the on-pitch referee does not see a certain action (e.g. because they are 
looking in a different direction or are at the other end of the field) or has a limited 
view of it (e.g. due to a player standing in the way), the VAR provides a further, 
very capable pair of eyes that capture the incident, thus reducing the number of 
factual errors. (It is for the same reason that the GLT, the other technological aid in 
football, is widely perceived to have been a success.12) 
 
The VAR has no comparable advantage when it comes to evaluative judgments. It 
is not a more just or fair referee, who is better at interpreting the laws of football – 
it is only a second opinion, albeit an influential one. Therefore, where a normative 
decision is at the heart of a call, as is the case in most standard-based offences, the 
VAR is of limited use. The person sitting in the video operating room, typically a 
referee themselves, will have a view on whether a certain challenge constitutes 
“excessive force” or “violent conduct”, but this view is not inherently preferable 
over that of the on-pitch referee. To put it differently, the VAR is no magical device 
that solves our normative problems and disagreements concerning the interpretation 
of football laws. And disagreements there are. One of the few studies examining 
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refereeing performance in relation to fouls (Samuel et al. 2019), the most frequent 
standard-based call in football, found that there was less than 63% consensus among 
experienced referees as to whether a certain challenge constituted a foul and only 
26% as to whether a yellow or a red card should be given. The VAR cannot change 
this. It is unable to turn an open-textured football law allowing for different ways 
of interpretation into a clear and easily applicable norm just by replaying the scene 
on a screen. 
 
This is not to say that the VAR is of no use for monitoring standard-based incidents. 
Every standard-based call has a factual component. Where, for instance, the on-
pitch referee erroneously believes to have spotted a contact between the defending 
side’s goalkeeper and the attacking team’s striker and consequently decides to 
award a penalty (as e.g. during the 2019/20 Champions League match between 
Manchester City and Shakhtar Donetsk), the VAR will be able to correct the factual 
assessment. The same goes for situations in which the referee is unable to see the 
incident, because they were too far away from the action or a player was blocking 
the view. Moreover, there can be the occasional serious evaluative error which the 
VAR will be able to correct. Think, for example, of the above-mentioned situation 
where a penalty kick is awarded for handball although the defender has kept their 
hands behind their back. This is the type of call which is so blatantly wrong that 
nine out of ten referees seeing the incident would have decided otherwise. But these 
will, as the initial experience with the VAR suggests, be relatively rare.  
 
Viewers of the English Premier League are likely to accept the foregoing depiction 
of the VAR’s problems concerning standard-based calls, but they may object that 
the system does not fare much better in relation to rule-based calls, especially those 
concerning offside.13 Hardly a week passes in the Premier League without at least 
one contentious VAR offside decision. The relevant scenes are usually similar. The 
attacking team’s player appears to be at the same level as the opponent’s last 
defender in the moment of the pass, the action continues until the former scores 
(assistant referees are meant to delay the flag unless the offside is evident), a call is 
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made (offside or no offside), and then the measuring begins: the VAR’s calibrated 
lines show that the former’s knee, chest, or shoulder is a couple of centimetres ahead 
of the latter’s shoulder, or vice versa, and the offside decision is upheld or 
overturned. Call this marginal offside.  
 
Why are marginal offside calls a more prominent issue in England than 
elsewhere?14 The reason is two-fold. To begin with, football in the Premier League 
is faster than in any other domestic or international competition, meaning that the 
sheer number of offside, both clear and marginal, is higher. Several factors are 
likely to have contributed to this development: a general increase in the pace of 
football over the past two decades; the parallel surge of the financial strength of 
Premier League clubs, which means that they can attract the best talent on the 
market; and a historical focus in English football on the virtues of speed and 
attacking, sometimes derided as “kick and rush”.15 Moreover, and related to this, 
interruptions to the game cause – due to the cultural expectation towards fast 
football – greater unhappiness among English spectators than those in other 
countries, where the sport is played at a slightly more leisurely pace. 
 
The more puzzling and important question is why these ultra-tight offside calls are 
so contentious. Other than the problem of delay (which may not, in fact, not be as 
serious as commonly assumed, with preliminary data indicating that the VAR 
delays matches by a mere 50 seconds on average16), it appears that the controversy 
is, partly, fuelled by technological issues and, partly, by broader questions relating 
to function of football refereeing and the formulation of the offside rule.  
 
Let us look at the technological side first. Collins (2020) has raised concerns about 
the ability of the VAR to accurately make ultra-tight offside calls.17 For assessing 
offside, the position at the moment the ball is played or touched by the attacking 
team’s passing player is relevant. To determine that moment is, in practice, harder 
than it may seem. The video footage which VAR review is based on is shot at 50 
frames per second. Yet, sometimes multiple frames can appear to capture the first 
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point of contact. The eventual choice of frame will, then, potentially affect the 
outcome of the offside call. According to one calculation, the error margin 
connected with choosing one frame over the one directly preceding it is around 19 
cm (Lawless 2019). Although this number is in fact likely to be lower (the estimate 
is based on one of the Premier League’s fastest players running at full speed, which 
is unrepresentative of the vast majority of offside incidents), the point remains a 
valid one. VAR review has a non-negligible margin of error, which is neither 
displayed in the video footage nor explained to the public.  
 
Further, Collins has suggested that marginal offside should not be corrected as a 
matter of principle. Arguing that sports officiating is about “justice not accuracy” 
(see already Collins 2010; Collins et al. 2016), he recommends rethinking offside, 
which “should not be seen as a binary decision – one side of a line or the other” but 
“a matter of human judgement” (Collins 2020, 44). His proposal reads as follows: 
“only if a player looks offside is the player offside”. Others have made similar 
suggestions, advocating that offside should be reformulated so that it requires there 
to be “clear daylight” between the attacking player and the opponent’s defender.18 
Both proposals – requiring that a player “looks offside” or has a “clear” advantage 
– would turn the offside rule into a standard. This, however, is unlikely to reduce 
the controversy surrounding marginal offside; it is more probable to have the exact 
opposite effect. If you think that the current levels of dissatisfaction in relation to 
offside calls are worrying, just imagine what will happen if, in addition to the factual 
component (is the player ahead of the last defender?), there would be an evaluative 
one (is the gap sufficiently visible or clear?). The experience in leagues which have 
experimented with removing calibrated lines from the VAR video footage is telling. 
The effect was a decrease in both predictability and decision-making accuracy.19 
 
A simpler and more effective solution might lie in making the technology more 
transparent by adding error margins of, say, 10 to 15 cm (which could be 
represented by a thicker calibrated line in the video), an option currently tested in 
the Dutch Eredivisie. This would kill two birds with one stone. Not only would the 
17 
 
doubts concerning the transparency and reliability of the video analysis be 
attenuated as possible errors would be laid bare, it would also lead to a situation 
where only actions in which the attacking side’s player is visibly ahead of the last 
defender are ruled out. In addition, and more ambitiously, a reformulation of the 
offside law could be considered indeed, but one that maintains its rule-like 
character. When a rule proves to be repeatedly over-inclusive, it may need tweaking 
to align it better with its underlying background principle. In the case of offside, 
this is: no player should have an undue advantage by having a shorter distance to 
traverse to the goal than the opponent’s defenders. Against this backdrop, it might, 
for instance, make sense to exclude body parts such as armpits and shoulders when 
assessing offside, and focus exclusively on the players’ feet.20 Although the former 
can be used to score goals (and are, therefore, currently counted when assessing 
offside), it is only the latter that allow players to cross the pitch.  
 
4. The Video Assistant Referee II: Threshold for Intervention 
 
The VAR protocol stipulates that the video assistant should only step in if there was 
a “clear and obvious error” or, practically less important, a “serious missed 
incident”. Where the threshold for intervention is set is crucial as it affects both how 
frequently the VAR will get active and how many of the head referee’s decisions 
will be corrected. In theory, the system could be designed in a variety of ways, but 
two main options should be distinguished. The first consists in giving the VAR the 
power to exercise what, in some appellate legal systems, is called de novo review. 
This entails a complete re-assessment of the incident “from scratch”, i.e. 
disregarding any prior refereeing decision made, and would lead to the VAR 
correcting each and every (reviewable) mistake that occurred on the pitch. The 
second option is having a system based on deferential review. Here, the VAR 
would, as a rule, defer to the on-pitch referee’s decisions and only step in where a 
call was deemed evidently wrong. This is the approach that the IFAB has chosen. 
It reduces not only the number of interventions but also that of reversals, which are 
limited to blatant errors.   
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Formally, the VAR is part of the refereeing team and merely “assists” the head 
referee in their work, akin to the assistant referees standing on the sides of the pitch. 
In reality, however, it acts more like an external review authority. The VAR is a 
geographically separate unit, typically located miles away from the stadium and the 
rest of the refereeing team in a special video operating room. Further, its role is to 
oversee the mistakes of the other referees. Preliminary evidence indicates that on-
pitch referees find it hard to decide against the VAR. This is understandable 
psychologically given that they are signalled, in front of the entire live and TV 
audience, that they may have just committed a fundamental and, to make matters 
worse, “obvious” mistake. From the 50 checks that led VAR to advise the referee 
to review their decision during the 2017/18 Bundesliga season, 48 led to a change 
in decision (96%); the corresponding reversal rates for the Portuguese Primeira Liga 
and the 2018 World Cup are 68% and 82% respectively. 
 
Although, in theory, the “clear and obvious error”-test is meant to apply to all 
reviewable decisions and incidents, a different practice has gradually emerged. 
Only in relation to standards is the test adhered by – in relation to rules, all errors 
are corrected, including minor ones, thus effectively establishing a de novo type of 
review. This two-pronged approach appears to have, sub silencio, been embraced 
by referees and video referees in leagues across the world. In England, it has even 
been adopted explicitly. In its statement on the application of the VAR, the Premier 
League (2018) explains that “factual decisions such as offsides, and the issue of 
whether a player is inside or outside the penalty area, are not subject to the ‘clear 
and obvious’ test.”  
 
This bifurcated approach, even if contradicting the IFAB’s guidelines, makes 
intuitive sense. Why should consequential factual errors in football games be 
tolerated if they can be rectified? Or, to put it more bluntly: if a call is wrong and 
we can see that it is wrong, why should it stand? It is precisely the VAR’s forte to 
spot and correct factual mistakes. Assuming that the technology is reliable and 
excessive delays can be avoided, there appears to be little reason to let incorrect 
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calls stand, especially if they are significant for the outcome of the game.21 (A 
different question is whether avoiding delays should even be given that much 
weight at the expense of accuracy.22) The considerable gains in terms of decision-
making accuracy and fairness appear to outweigh the limited costs in terms of time 
and effort (similarly, see Berman 2011).  
 
The more vital element of the two-prong approach, however, is the strict adherence 
to the “clear and obvious error” test in relation to standards, especially when it 
comes to the evaluative component of a call. Here, the VAR has no inherent 
advantage over the on-pitch referee. Mistakes still can happen: factual errors are 
possible as are occasional blunders in how a football law is applied. But, outside 
these situations, a healthy dose of restraint on the VAR’s part is warranted. 
Otherwise one risks substituting one reasonable interpretation of a football law (that 
of the on-pitch referee) for another (that of the VAR).23 The first VAR season in 
the Bundesliga provides a cautionary tale in this respect. After a turbulent first 
couple of months with the new technology, an internal communication of the 
German football association was leaked to the public, showing that referees had 
been advised to look for VAR guidance not only in cases of clear errors but also 
when they simply had doubts about how to decide. The result was a high number 
of “advisory opinions”, which led to initial reasonable calls being overturned. The 
disclosure prompted a great deal of backlash and, as a result, the guidelines were 
changed back to the “clear and obvious error” test. This, in turn, reduced the number 
of VAR interventions, while increasing the overall satisfaction with the system 
(Kolbinger 2019, 233-236). 
 
Hence, there are plausible reasons for the evolving practice of subjecting rule-based 
decisions to a more lenient and standard-based decisions to a more stringent test. 
However, as always, context matters. In leagues marked by a greater-than-average 
distrust in football referees, for instance due to recurring corruption scandals, 
adopting a less demanding test for VAR interventions can make sense. It will 
introduce a further layer of protection that will render match-fixing more difficult. 
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Where, to the contrary, we have high numbers of minimal rules infractions the 
policing of which takes a great toll on the fluidity of the game, it might be justified 
to impose a more stringent threshold.24 The problems with marginal offside in the 
Premier League are an example for an environment where raising the bar for VAR 
interventions – or, in the words of the IFAB’s general secretary, not being “too 
forensic” (BBC Sports 2019) – could be an appropriate solution (if the reforms 
discussed above are not implemented). The League’s decision to adopt de novo 
review for offside calls is certainly counterproductive in this regard.  
 
In addition to affecting when the VAR should intervene, the rules/standards 
distinction is also helpful for considering how this intervention should take place. 
The VAR protocol distinguishes between two types of video assistance. For 
“factual decisions”, it states that a VAR-only review will usually be appropriate, 
meaning that the on-pitch referee does not have to watch the incident themselves 
but can rely on the information provided by the video assistant. Such decisions 
include the position of an offence or player (for offside and penalty), the point of 
contact (for handball and foul), and questions such as whether the ball has gone out 
of play. For “subjective decisions”, like the intensity of a foul and handball 
considerations, an on-field review is recommended. This involves the referee 
themselves taking another look at the incident on the side-pitch monitor. 
 
Some leagues – among them, at least initially, the Premier League25 – have chosen 
to reduce the number of on-field reviews and made all or most reviews VAR-only. 
If what has been argued throughout this article is correct, the IFAB is right in 
insisting that these associations bring their national guidelines in line with its VAR 
protocol. VAR-only reviews are a good idea when it comes to factual decisions, 
most of which revolve around the application of rules or the factual component of 
a standard-based call. Letting the VAR determine the issue will usually be faster 
and yield as accurate, in some cases even more accurate results – research suggests 
that physical factors like exhaustion can affect the ability to decide correctly 
(Catteuw et al. 2010) – than making the referee review the incident on a pitch-side 
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monitor. The situation is different for subjective decisions, which all concern 
standard-based calls. The VAR protocol recommends an on-field review here 
precisely to avoid the aforementioned risk of substituting the VAR’s assessment for 
that of the referee. Allowing the latter to re-watch the incident themselves ensures 
that ultimately the central and often difficult normative decisions will, as intended, 




Just like legal norms, football norms can be divided into rules and standards. The 
choice between the two does not only affect the way in which football laws are 
enforced in general, it has repercussions for the use of technological aids. The VAR 
has shown to be a valuable tool for enforcing rule infractions, while contributing 
comparatively little to strengthening “football justice” when it comes to decisions 
turning on standards. This varied impact is not because the technology is 
insufficiently developed, it is a consequence of the nature of the football laws it is 
tasked with adjudicating on. The proverbial “hawk eye”, the VAR is able to reduce 
epistemic problems in football officiating. This is why it performs so well when it 
comes to rule-like offences, which require factual assessments only. It has no 
comparable advantage in relation to evaluative judgments, which explains the 
persisting difficulties the system faces when dealing with standard-like offences 
such as fouls and handball violations. 
 
The findings of this article have relevance beyond the “beautiful game”. The 
rules/standards distinction can be found in most sports, many of which have 
introduced, or considered introducing, technological aids. The present analysis 
highlights the importance of looking not just at the supply side but the demand side 
when doing so. As important as the design and setup of the aids themselves is the 
nature of the tasks they are meant to fulfil. When setting out the competences of 
devices like the VAR, it is crucial to consider the environment they are applied in 
and the norms are expected to enforce. This reflective process might reveal that the 
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technology’s potential is high in some areas and surprisingly low in others, insights 
that will inform decisions as to whether a given system should be established to 




1. But see Nlandu 2011, 30-31. 
2. This is even true of the aforementioned speed limits: in many countries, driving faster than 
allowed is illegal but minimal infractions, e.g. driving less than 3 miles per hour over the limit, will 
not be penalised. 
3. The fact that the distinction is not clear-cut does not mean that there are not significant differences 
between the two types concerning their clarity and predictability of application as well as the scope 
of interpretive discretion which officials have (see remainder of section). 
4. Similarly, for tennis, see Berman 2011b, 1361 et seq. 
5. “Passive” offside is formulated in a more standard-like manner: it requires the player who is in 
an offside position to interfere with an opponent, for instance, by preventing them from playing or 
being able to play the ball by “clearly obstructing the opponent’s line of vision” or “making an 
obvious action which clearly impacts on the ability of an opponent to play the ball” (Law 11.2). 
6. It includes attempts to deceive the referee (e.g. by diving), committing an offence that interferes 
with a promising attack of the opponent, and “showing a lack of respect for the game”; see IFAB 
2020, Law 12(3). 
7. The “six second rule” whereby the goalkeeper must not take longer than six seconds to release 
the ball, which is meant to prevent time play, has, due to underenforcement, effectively become a 
standard prohibiting exceedingly long tardiness. 
8. Instant replays were introduced in 1986 by the American National Football League (but 
temporarily suspended between 1992 and 1999) and in 2002 by the National Basketball Association. 
The Hawk-Eye system has been used since 2006 in tennis and 2001 in cricket, which had already 
experimented with a variety of other technological aids already since the early 1990s. 
9. Helsen et al. 2006; Oudejans et al. 2005; Catteeuw et al. 2010; Hüttermann et al. 2017. 
10. See www.reuters.com/article/us-soccer-worldcup-fifa-infantino-idUSKBN1K31IG. 
11. The Twitter account “VAR-watch”, which monitors the technology’s performance in the 
German Bundesliga, has rated 13 VAR decisions during the 2019/20 season as “questionable”, 8 of 
which concern penalties. 
12. This is not to say that there have not been problems. The French Football League suspended the 
use of a GLT system developed by GoalControl in 2018 after a series of errors, before signing a 
contract with market leader Hawk-Eye. But even Hawk-Eye’s technology occasionally malfunctions 
as the Premier League match between Sheffield United and Aston Villa in June 2020 showed. GLT 
failed to detect a goal for Sheffield although Villa’s goalkeeper had, after catching a ball from a 
cross, carried it over the goal line. Hawk-Eye explained that this was the result of the level of 
“occlusion” by the players involved, which had not been reached in the 9,000 previous matches 
during which the system was applied (Ostlere 2020). Football commentators were quick to point out 
that the VAR could – and should – have intervened to correct the mistake. These incidents should 
not detract from the fact that the GLT has worked remarkably well in the vast number of games in 
which it has been applied, leading to correct decisions in critical situations, some of which have 
decided titles races, such as the goal-line clearance by John Stones in the match between Manchester 
City and Liverpool in the 2018/19 season, where GLT correctly signalled that the ball was not fully 
over the goal line, with only 11 millimetres missing. 
13. See Collins 2020, 9. 
14. Addressing the growing frustration in the Premier League, Gianni Infantino has noted that “In 







15. See Wilson 2013. This does not mean that the phenomenon will remain a predominantly English 
one. The modern game becomes faster across the world and is, for tactical reasons, played on an 
increasingly confined space on the pitch, which is likely to contribute to the problems described 
below. 
16. Figures for the 2019/20 Premier League season: see www.premierleague.com/news/1293321. 
These confirm earlier findings from the Bundesliga (Deutsche Fussball Liga 2018), where VAR 
caused a delay of 60 seconds per game on average during its first season. 
17. Collins 2020.  
18. See uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-ifab/fifa-chief-infantino-says-open-to-changes-in-offside-
law-idUKKCN20M2X7. 
19. During the first half of the 2017/18 Bundesliga season, the German Football Federation decided 
to not employ calibrated lines for VAR offside reviews and, instead, relied on simple video footage 
of the scene, leading to a situation where only if a player “looked offside” he was offside. The result 
was several incorrect and many contentious offside calls (Kolbinger 2019), triggering much 
dissatisfaction among players and commentators. In reaction to the criticisms, the calibrated lines 
were introduced during the second half of the season, eliminating much of the controversy. 
20. As of the 2020/21 season, the definition of handball has changed: the boundary between the arm 
and the shoulder (which is the boundary between handball and no handball) is now defined as the 
bottom of the armpit. This, on the one hand, means that players can score goals with the side of their 
shoulder. On the other hand, it also has the effect that players are more easily in an offside position, 
as their shoulder counts as a relevant body part for the purpose of the offside decision. For an 
illustration of the problem see www.bbc.co.uk/sport/football/54855596 (discussing the ruling out of 
a Patrick Bamford goal “for pointing” in a match between Leeds United and Crystal Palace). 
21. A related question, which is bracketed in this paper, is whether this means that the VAR’s 
competence catalogue should be expanded beyond the four decisions/incidents that are currently 
reviewable. In most sports, technological aids are used to correct consequential refereeing errors 
only, not all errors. This limitation is the result of a cost/benefit analysis: while there is a lot to be 
gained from correcting a mistake that has a significant impact on the outcome of the game (e.g. 
goal/no goal), there are few, if any, benefits attached to correcting minor infractions with no genuine 
impact (e.g. simple foul in the middle of the pitch). As argued by Berman, video review systems 
should be designed so that they “maximize error correction up to the point at which the marginal 
cost exceeds the marginal benefits” (2011, 1693; cf. Nlandu 2011). This does not mean that the 
current list of reviewable decisions/incidents strikes the ideal balance between the two, but it makes 
a prima facie case for not reviewing every refereeing mistake.  
22. Berman 2011, 1703-1706. 
23. This is a major difference between football and other sports where technological aids are, 
primarily or even exclusively, used to enforce rule-like norms, such as American football; see 
Berman 2011. 
24. Having different VAR regimes in different countries or leagues is in tension with the principle 
of universality underlying the Laws of the Game. But the IFAB has, over the past years, warmed up 
to the idea of differentiated and context-specific arrangements, e.g. in lower-tier and youth 
competitions.  
25. As of the 2020/21 season, the Premier League is following the IFAB’s VAR Protocol on the use 
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